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Forensic analysis on a media with fragmented and deleted files is a difficult task.
There is a lack of tools and techniques that can accurately and quickly detect fragmented
suspect files. Fragmented file data that resides in slack space is often overlooked by
digital forensic tools.
This thesis proposes to use a prefix signature of 4, 8, 16, or 32 bytes instead of
either a complete sector comparison or a hash of the complete sector. The experiments
show that the 32 byte has as much discrimination as an MD5 or SHA hash in uniquely
identifying a sector.
It is shown that the false positive rate does not exceed 10% for prefix signature
sizes of 32, 16, and 8 bytes. Also the difference in false positive rates for the 32 and 16
byte prefixes does not exceed 25% as compared to MD5 and SHA hashes.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

1.1

Introduction to Digital Forensics
Computer forensics is the use of technology and science in order to recover facts

from a computer facilitated crime. The analysis of the obtained data is one of the most
time consuming stages in a forensic investigation. This thesis presents a technique that
enables data analysis at line speed (i.e., data transfer speed) of the disk device. Not only
will the analysis of the disk be faster, but evidence that may not be discovered by existing
forensic analysis tools can be found with this approach.
The approach presented in this thesis detects fragments from deleted files that are
resident in slack and free spaces. Slack space is space allocated by the operating system
(OS) for a file but is unused by the file. Slack space may contain data from previous files
that occupied the sectors from the end of the data in the file currently occupying the
cluster to the end of the cluster. The typical behavior of most OSs is to not overwrite this
disk area for performance reasons. Because of this, fragments of previously deleted files
can be recovered from slack space. Free space is area on the disk that the OS designates
as storage space available for allocation to files. Free space is disk area that the OS can
use to store any data. When a file is deleted, the area the file occupies is marked as free
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space and its content is typically not removed for performance reasons. This means that
the content of deleted files can also be recovered from free space.
There are several stages of computer forensics. Initially sources of evidence are
identified, data is then preserved, a copy of the data is analyzed, and finally the facts are
presented. The initial identification of the sources of evidence is a crucial stage in
forensic investigation. Prior to a search, a detailed warrant is obtained that lists all
possible sources of forensic evidence. A forensic investigator must be thorough in listing
the sources that are to be searched. Many devices other than a computer’s hard disk may
contain evidence. Devices that may potentially contain evidence include, but are not
limited to the following:
•

Floppy Disks

•

CDs and DVDs

•

Portable Music Players

•

Cell Phones

•

USB and other Flash Memory Devices

It is important to be as thorough as possible when gathering evidence. Besides
gathering evidence in plain sight, a forensic investigator needs to be able to collect all
possible hidden evidence. Printouts and other physical evidence in the vicinity of the
seized computer can provide clues of possible passwords for hidden and encrypted data.
Once a suspect disk is seized, a copy of the disk image is made. It is important to
never use the original disk for analysis in order to prevent contamination of evidence.
The disk image copy is compared to the original to assure that it is an exact duplicate.

3
This comparison is done by hashing the original disk image and comparing it to the hash
of the duplicated disk image. Analysis on the copies of the disk image instead of the
original disk assures that in the event that the data is corrupted or modified, the original
remains intact. In court it must be proven not only that the data exists on the device but
that the device contents have not been modified during the search and analysis process.
The most demanding of the above tasks is the analysis of the data. Disk sizes have
grown to the near terabyte range within the last few years, and a suspect server may
contain several of these large disks. Manual inspection and analysis of such a large
quantity of data is infeasible. This stage of the forensics investigation is the main concern
of this thesis.
The final step on the forensic investigation is to present the evidence obtained
from analysis of the media in a court of law.
To understand the process of inspecting and analyzing a disk, one must
understand the characteristics of the disk itself. At a high level, a disk contains files. The
files are organized in sets of contiguous sectors called clusters. Clusters are made up of
smaller partitions called sectors. A sector is the smallest addressable storage unit on a
disk. A sector is 512 bytes in length. A cluster in a default Windows system formatted
with NT File System (NTFS) is four kilobytes in length. This means that a cluster
consists of eight sectors. A cluster is the smallest amount of space that a file can occupy
on a disk. This means that if a one kilobyte file is written to a disk having four kilobyte
clusters, four kilobytes are allocated for the file. One kilobyte is used for data and the
remaining three kilobytes are reserved but unused by the file. A file can range from less

4
than a kilobyte to more than several gigabytes. Clusters are not guaranteed to be
contiguous for the length of a file but the eight sectors in a cluster are contiguous.
Input and output to a digital medium is relatively slow compared to the internal
processing of the computer. Because of this, a computer makes optimizations in order to
minimize the read and write operations to the digital medium. One example of optimizing
is what happens when a file is deleted from a disk. When a file is deleted, only the pointer
to the data is deleted. With no pointer to the file, the disk area containing the data may be
overwritten. This is done in order to minimize the I/O to the disk. There is no need to
erase or remove the data. Indicating that the deleted file contents can be overwritten by
the operating system at a later time is sufficient. This means that data from the file can
still be recovered after the file is deleted as long as it has not been overwritten.

Directory Entry (6000 byte file)

s0

s1

s2

s3

s4

s5

s6

s7

Key

Sector containing
file Data
Sectors allocated
to the file but unused (slack space)
Sectors allocated
to other files or free space

Figure 1.1 File Allocation on a Disk

Figure 1.1 shows how, for example, a 6000 byte file on a disk with four kilobyte
clusters can be stored on disk. A cluster is composed of eight contiguous sectors. The

5
sectors are labeled S0 through S7. The sectors with file data are shown with diagonal
hashes. Once a cluster is filled, the next cluster that contains the file data may not be (and
in the majority of cases is not) contiguous to the previous cluster containing the file’s
data. This is represented by the grey clusters shown in between the clusters used by the
file. In the second cluster used for the file, only 1904 bytes are used for the file data. As
shown in Figure 1, there is unused space in the last sector that contains file data, which is
shown in solid black, and the remaining sectors until the end of the cluster are also
unused (i.e., is slack space). The remaining unused sectors in the cluster are not
overwritten. They contain the same data that they contained previous to the cluster being
allocated for the file. This means that portions of data that have previously been deleted
from the disk may still reside on the disk even if the clusters have been allocated for a
new file.
Even in the event that a file has been overwritten, portions of the deleted data still
may exist in the slack space of the new file. Slack space is the space between the end of
file data and the end of the last cluster allocated to the file and is shown in figure 1.1 in
solid black. It is important to check free space and slack space for evidence on a disk.
Data that has been deleted may still reside in the free space on the disk. It is expected that
files or fragments may also reside in the slack space on a drive. Once a file is overwritten,
the overwritten sectors cannot be recovered by conventional means. Techniques such as
Scanning Tunneling Microscopy (STM) can be used to recover overwritten data and are
not covered in this thesis. However these techniques are expensive and time consuming
and cannot be applied extensively.
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It is also important to note that user files are not the only data that may contain
evidence on the digital medium. Operating systems use a page file or swap space to
augment the physical memory of the system. A CPU can access data only if it is in
physical memory. The amount of physical memory is usually insufficient to store
everything that needs to be accessed on a system. Data that is not currently being
accessed gets moved from physical memory to a page file or swap space. This page file
or swap space resides on the disk. Therefore, additional data of interest to the forensic
investigator may be present in these special areas of the disk. This means that data loaded
into a computer’s memory has the potential to be stored on the disk even if it has never
been explicitly saved to the disk by a user of the system.
The remaining sections of the thesis contain the motivations and experiments to
derive a new approach for the analysis of forensic evidence using a sector level
comparison technique. A reason why a new technique for data analysis is needed is
presented in the following section. Chapter 2 contains a literature survey on previous
related research. Chapter 3 contains the approach used in this thesis for performing the
forensic analysis, as well as, the theoretical basis of this analysis. Chapter 4 describes the
experimentation used to verify the claims of the techniques described in chapter 3.
Chapter 5 contains the results from the experiments in chapter 4. Chapter 6 contains
conclusions obtained from the research and experimentation.

1.2

Motivation
In a typical forensic investigation using state-of-the-art tools, an investigator uses

data carving tools to recover the content of complete files from the disk image (file
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fragments are typically not recovered automatically). The investigator then computes
MD5 [10] or SHA [5] hashes for these file and compares the hashes against a database of
known illicit files known as the master file hash database. A match of the hash of a file
on disk with a hash in the database of illicit files indicates that the file on disk under
investigation is illicit. Furthermore, the matching database record also identifies the disk
file. However, because the database of illicit files only contains hashes corresponding to
complete files, this approach cannot be used to detect the presence of illicit data from file
fragments that were previously deleted and have been partially overwritten. In some
cases the file system information of the deleted files may also have been overwritten.
Without the file system information it is impossible to recover file fragments without
examining the individual sectors on the disk.
When recovering evidence of illicit file fragments, the analysis must show where
each sector of an illicit file resides on the disk and where in the corresponding complete
file it belongs. A naïve approach for detecting fragments of illicit files is to compare the
content of every sector on disk against a database of data from illicit files organized in
sectors. However, there are several problems with this approach. The main problem is
that possession of illicit material is typically illegal in most jurisdictions, so a database of
illicit file content will not be freely available for use in the field by forensic practitioners.
Additionally, the storage requirements for the database will be large because it will need
to maintain the content of all illicit files. Also, the time required to compare the content
of a 512-byte sector against all 512-byte sectors in the database will also be large.
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Computers are becoming ubiquitous and because of this, the use of computers in
crime is also rising. This has resulted in increasing workloads and backlogs of cases for
forensic investigators. Not only is there a need for a new way to uniquely identify illicit
data but also a need to speed the process of the comparison of acquired signatures to the
signatures in the master image set. With disk sizes reaching the terabyte mark the use of
the naïve approach described above is infeasible. The image set would be significantly
large and the time required for performing the comparisons would also be prohibitively
long.

1.3

Proposed Methodology
An approach to reducing the storage requirement and search time of the sector

database is to store 16-byte MD5 or 20-byte SHA hashes as signatures representing the
content of each sector of all illicit files as opposed to storing the entire sectors. This
database of signatures is designated as the master sector signature database (MSSD).
The comparison of short signatures instead of complete sectors is faster because fewer
bytes need to be compared. Also, the use of short signatures enables more signatures to
be stored in faster cache memory, further speeding up the comparison process.
Furthermore, comparison of short signatures reduces the implementation logic required
on devices such as field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) or application specific
integrated circuits (ASICs).
Clearly, matching a sector signature with a signature in the MSSD is not a
confirmation that the sector belongs to an illicit file. This is because it is possible for two
completely different sectors with distinct content can cause a hash collision (i.e., they can

have the same signature).
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This condition is known as a false positive indication.

Therefore, a further full sector comparison must be performed in order to confirm that the
content of the sector matches with that of an illicit file. Note that, if a file sector does not
match any signature in the MSSD, it is guaranteed that the sector does not match any
known illicit file.
Because only those sectors on disk whose signatures appear in the MSSD must be
subjected to a full sector comparison, this proposed approach has the potential for
significantly reducing the time required to scan a disk for illicit data. This is especially
true if the sector signatures have sufficient discrimination power so as to reduce the false
positive rates significantly.

Because MD5 and SHA hashes are known to produce

random hashes, these hashes will be used for constructing sector signatures in this thesis.
Furthermore, if the false positive rate is low, the secondary full sector comparison can be
performed offline. This means that a portable embedded forensic device only needs to
store the small MSSD online and can perform the initial signature match online during
the process of capturing the disk’s image.
A further improvement in performance and reduction of resources in an
embedded platform can be achieved if a sequence of the first few bytes of a sector, i.e.,
the sector prefix is used as the sector’s signature as opposed to MD5 and SHA hashes.
The database of sector prefixes is known as the master sector prefix database (MSPD).
Performance is improved because the hashes do not need to be computed after a sector is
read into memory. Resource reduction results from the fact that logic on an FPGA or an
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ASIC need not be dedicated for modules that compute per-sector MD5 and/or SHA
hashes.
This thesis investigates the feasibility of using sector signatures and prefixes for
detecting and reporting the presence of illicit file data on disk that has been sized during a
digital forensic investigation.

An analysis of storage requirements given different

signature lengths is presented. A series of experiments showing the rates of false positive
indications resulting from MD5 and SHA sector signatures and from prefix signatures of
various sizes is also presented.

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE SURVEY

2.1

JPEG File Format
A large portion of the analysis will be done on JPEG files. Thus it is necessary to

understand the composition of a JPEG file. Many files including JPEG files have a small
block at the beginning of the file that designates it is a JPEG. This header also contains
information describing the remaining file. Because JPEG files have a header this may
generate a large number of duplicate sectors.

Figure 2.1 JPEG File Format from[6]
11
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As shown in figure 2.1 the JPEG file starts with a SOI, start of image, marker.
This is a two byte field with a value of 0xFF 0xD8. The frame that follows the SOI
marker has a header portion. This header starts with two bytes with a value of 0xFF
0xEO.

This is the APP0, or application segment number zero, for the JPEG file.

Following the APP0 is a two byte field that contains the length of the segment excluding
the APP0 marker. Next is a five byte identifier field with a value of 0x4A, 0x46, 0x49,
0x46, 0x00 (JFIF00). After the identifier field is the version field. The version field is two
bytes long and contains the JPEG version number, major then minor (0x01 0x02 for
1.02). The data in the header described above accounts for the first thirteen bytes of the
JPEG file. This may make smaller prefix signatures inaccurate in uniquely identifying a
sector in a JPEG file. The experiments in chapter 3 will show whether there is a high
degree of replication for the prefix signatures.

Figure 2.2 JPEG file viewed in a hex editor

Figure 2.2 above shows the first 64 bytes of a JPEG file. One can see the header
information described above in the first several bytes of the file.

2.2

FPGA Based Search
This paper describes a means to search a disk for target image files based on the

first 16 bytes of each cluster. The first 16 bytes were used to create a list of signatures for
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the file (i.e., one signature per cluster of the file) [4]. An optimized binary search for
implementation on an FPGA is also used to compare the signatures versus the disk data.
The same process is used in this research with the following changes. The master image
set is comprised of k byte wide signatures for each sector of a file, not just a signature per
cluster. This research also takes advantage of the high speed BRAM on the FPGA to
increase the number of signatures which can be matched. The previous research did not
take into account that partial file fragments may reside in the file slack. It could search
free space but not the unused space that was allocated to a file. This proof of concept
work has shown that a hardware implementation can yield as much as a six fold
performance increase even without the use of high speed BRAM.
Several current research efforts are investigating and developing fast string
matching engines [1-3, 13]. This string matching research is also implemented on an
FPGA due to the highly pipelined nature of the problem. Network intrusion detection
systems (NDIS) are the main area such technology is developed for. Snort is an example
of such a NDIS using a fast string matching engine [11]. A NDIS system, such as Snort,
searches on either a fixed string or a regular expression. The search pattern for these
systems can be found at any location in the data stream. This research does not consider
that the signature may appear at any arbitrary location on the disk. Only the first 16 bytes
of each sector need be examined.
One challenge of using reconfigurable computers such as an FPGA is that the
search data, the signature table, may be dynamic in nature and needs to be updated
frequently. The time to “synthesize” and “place and route” tools required to complete the
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FPGA configuration are time consuming. There is research to use the BRAM as a lookup
table for the state machine [7, 12]. The BRAM on the FPGA will be utilized in this
research to assist in meeting the line speed timing constraints. BRAM will allow for a
larger database of signatures to be searched versus using external DDR alone.
The current research and existing searching techniques are not directly related to
solving the signature matching problem this research addresses. The exception is the
FPGA hardware search done by Dandass [4]. The focus of this research is to analyze a
disk versus a large master image set at line speed. No other research known has used the
first k bytes of data to try to uniquely identify a sector. Only one paper was found that
described the use of an FPGA to perform a forensic analysis of a hard disk at line speed
[4].

2.3

Fragmented File Reassembly
The problem of reassembling fragmented files occurs often in the field of digital

forensics. File fragmentation can occur for a variety of reasons. There are several
approaches [8] to reassemble file fragments. These techniques concentrate on unknown
images with no knowledge of the size and ordering of the fragments. The work in this
thesis is different in the fact that the forensic investigator will have a complete set of
hashes or signatures for a suspect file. Once fragments are found on the disk it is trivial to
find where they belong in the file as a whole. No complex disjoint graph algorithm need
be computed. A simple inspection of the intact file’s hashes and signatures will show
where the fragment exists. The recreation of a file from fragments is simple in the
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research because a database of hashes and signatures from a complete file must be
present in order to perform a search for illicit data on a suspect disk.

2.4

Data Carving
Data carving is the practice of searching a disk or other media for a file or

fragment of a file by its content. This is usually done to recover deleted files on a disk.
Once a file is deleted only the directory entry is deleted. This minimizes the I/O to the
disk and still allows the space to be reused. If the directory entry is overwritten or
unrecoverable data carving techniques must be used in order to retrieve a file or file
fragments. The majority of current data carving tools carve out data between suspect
headers and footers [9]. This is a naïve approach and will not work when reconstructing
fragmented files. Many other data carving tools only work on data that resides in
contiguous blocks on the disk. Again this will not work on files that have been
fragmented. The approach given in this thesis will work on fragmented files as well as on
files that have been partially overwritten.

CHAPTER III
APPROACH

3.1

Introduction
It is proposed in this thesis that the first k bytes of a sector, where k is an element

of the set {4, 8, 16, 32}, can uniquely identify the content of most sectors of a disk. If this
is true, then using the first few sectors on disk for identifying sectors for further forensic
analysis has the potential for reducing the time required for performing full sector
matches.

Furthermore, the reduction of storage requirements for storing the short

prefixes as opposed to full sector content will enable the implementation of forensic
analysis tools in easily transportable embedded platforms. For example, the pipelined
nature of FPGA devices enables the comparison of signatures and data retrieval to occur
at line speed.
Additionally, this comparison technique can find illicit data that may have been
overlooked by other search means. All data on the disk is compared to the MSSD,
including the slack space of the last used sector in an allocated cluster as well as the
unmodified sectors after the last used sector in an allocated cluster. This sector by sector
analysis can identify illicit data that exists on the hard drive as long as it has not been
overwritten.
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3.2

Theoretical Performance Analysis
This section formalizes the relationships between the various parameters that

contribute to the design of a signature scanning system.

3.3

Signature Extraction
Signatures are essentially the first λ bytes in each 512-byte block of a file.

Consider a master image set, F = {f: where f is a file such that |f| ≥ λ}. Let ζf be the set of
signatures that can be extracted from f ∈ F. The maximum number of signatures, |ζf|, that
can be extracted from f is given as follows:

ζf

 f 

, where ( f mod 512) ≥ λ
 512 
=
.


f

, where ( f mod 512) < λ
 512 



(1)

Note that if the last sector in f occupies less than λ bytes then the content of the
last sector is not used in signature extraction.
The set of signatures, S that can be extracted from F is defined as:
S = {s: s ∈ ζf , ∀ f ∈ F}. The maximum number of signatures in S is given as follows:

S =

∑ζ

f

.

f ∈F

(2)

A signature that is duplicated is stored only once in the signature set. However,
duplicated signatures can map to more than one sector in one or more files.
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3.4

Resident Signature Set Size
The set of signatures, R, represents the set of signatures that are resident in

memory (i.e., the signatures that are available for matching in the binary search). The
number of signatures in R is a function of the available memory and of the signature
length. The following equation gives the number of signatures, |R| that can be stored in a
memory of size M bytes:
M 
R =  .
λ 

(3)

Typically, the storage capacity of memory devices is expressed in byte quantities
that are powers of 2.

If λ is also a power of two then equation (3) can be rewritten as

follows:
2m
2l ,
= 2 m −l

R =

(4)

where M = 2m, λ = 2l, and m >> l.

3.5

File Coverage
When every signature in R represents a unique file sector, |R| represents the

minimum number of file sectors that can be scanned for using the binary search
approach. However, when signatures in R match more than one sector in F, then the total
number of sectors that can be scanned for is greater than |R|. Note that while there is no
theoretical upper limit to the number of file sectors that can be represented by |R|, the
number of distinct sectors represented by a single signature needs to be small in practical
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systems in order to reduce the amount of full sector matches that need to be performed
after a signature match occurs.
If σ represents the average number of file sectors that each signature in R
matches, then the maximum amount of file data that can be scanned for using the
signature matching technique used in this thesis is given by the following equation:

B = 512σ R .

(5)

When M = 2m and λ = 2l, then (5) can be rewritten as follows:
B = 512σ 2 m −l .

3.6

(6)

Timing Analysis
The following equation gives the maximum number of iterations of a binary

search algorithm are required in order to locate a sector signature against the signatures in
R:

γ = lg( R ) .

(7)

When M = 2m and λ = 2l, then (7) can be rewritten as follows:

γ = m−l .

(8)

A binary search iteration, however, is composed of a sequence of operations that
require certain amount of execution time. In addition to the binary search iterations,
practical implementations also require time for executing setup and termination
operations. The total worst-case time for matching a signature d from the disk with a
signature in R is given by the following:
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T = ts + γti + te,

(9)

where ts, ti, and te are the execution times of the setup operation, a single iteration, and
exit operations, respectively.
In an FPGA-based implementation, the iteration operation can be further
decomposed into the following three operations: (a) signature fetch, (b) signature
comparison, and (c) iteration setup. Note that the computation of midpoints occurs
concurrently with the signature fetch operation, and therefore, does not contribute to the
execution time of the iteration.
The signature fetch operation is responsible for fetching the signature rm ∈ R
corresponding to the current midpoint of the binary search iteration from storage for
subsequent comparison with the signature from disk. The time taken to complete this
fetch operation is a function of the type of storage (i.e., DDR RAM or BRAM), and λ.
The type of memory is a factor because DDR RAM is external to the FPGA and
has a worst-case latency of approximately 30 cycles. BRAM is a limited amount of onchip memory that has a latency of 1 cycle. Memory access latency is the delay between
the time at which the address is presented to the memory device and when the memory
device produces the content of the addressed location on its output ports.
Although BRAM is significantly faster than DDR, BRAM cannot be used to store
all of R because BRAM capacity is restricted to a few hundred kilobytes in the current
generation of FPGA devices.

Therefore, in the FPGA-based signature scanning

implementation, the BRAM memory is used for storing Rc ⊆ R (i.e., a small subset of the
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resident image set) in order to speedup the initial iterations of the binary search
implementation.
The following equation gives the number of signatures, |Rc| that can be stored in a
BRAM memory of size C bytes:

C 
Rc =   .
λ 

(10)

When the storage capacity of BRAM and λ are powers of then equation (3) can be
rewritten as follows:
2c
Rc = l
2 ,
= 2 c −l

(11)

where C = 2c, λ = 2l, and c >> l.
In this research, the |Rc| and |R| are organized such that the first γc iterations of the
binary search algorithm fetches signatures from BRAM and the remaining γ - γc iterations
fetch signatures from DDR RAM.
The number of iterations that fetch memory from BRAM is given by the
following:

γ c = lg( Rc ) .

(12)

When C = 2c and λ = 2l, then (12) can be rewritten as follows:

γc = c−l.

(13)

The following equation refines equation (9) in order to take the different kinds of
memory accesses into account:

22
T = ts + γc(tµ + tBRAM) + (γ - γc)(tµ + tDDR) + te,

(14)

where tµ is the combined time required for iteration setup and signature
comparison and tBRAM and tDDR are signature fetch latencies for accessing signatures in
BRAM and DDR RAM, respectively. Expanding and rearranging the terms in Equation
(14) results in the following equation:
T = ts + te + γtµ + γctBRAM + (γ - γc)tDDR
= ts + te + lg(|R|)tµ + lg(|Rc|)tBRAM + (lg(|R|) - lg(|Rc|))tDDR.

(15)

Equation 15 provides a straightforward mechanism for numerically analyzing the
relationships between the number of signatures that must be mainlined in BRAM and
DDR RAM in order to meet execution timing constraints. Furthermore, the equation can
also be use to analyze tradeoffs in terms of execution time that will result when the size
of the resident set of image signatures and the number of signatures in BRAM is varied.

3.7

Hypothesis
The analysis above shows that using short signatures and prefixes has a positive

impact on the storage requirements and on the execution speed of the binary search
algorithm. Using signatures and prefixes, however, can result in false positives that can
only be resolved using full sector comparisons.

Furthermore, a reduction in prefix

lengths will increase the number of false positives. With increasing false positives, an
increasing number of full-sector comparisons must be made to ensure a match. A large
number of false positives requiring a secondary full sector confirmation match will
reduce the overall performance of the system.
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The primary goal of this thesis is to analyze and compare the extent to
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increased search speed and utilization of fewer device logic resources.
The hypothesis of this research is that short MD5-based and SHA-based
signatures or short prefixes 4, 8, 16, and 32 bytes in length of every
sector on a disk can uniquely identify the sectors with a false positive
rate of less than ten percent.

Furthermore, using short prefixes result in

an increase in false positive matches of no more that twenty-five percent
greater than the false positive rates of using MD5-based and SHA-based
sector signatures.

CHAPTER IV
EXPERIMENTS

4.1

Design of Experiments
In order to prove the hypothesis, a series of experiments are performed in this

research. There are two main experimentation phases described in the sections below.
Section 4.2 describes the experiment for determining the uniqueness of the prefix
signature versus an MD5 or SHA hash on files typically found on a hard drive (e.g., text
files, office documents, executables, multimedia files, etc.). The section describes how
the signatures are determined, how they are extracted, and how they are stored. Section
4.3 describes the experiment for comparison of various sized prefix signatures.

4.2

Uniqueness Attribute Experiment
This experiment determines the uniqueness properties of the sequence of the first

k bytes of every sector versus the uniqueness of an MD5 or SHA hash of the complete
sector in a large number of sample JPEG image files downloaded from the internet. For
this experiment approximately 30 million JPEG image files are downloaded from the
internet via NNTP servers. The first thirty-two bytes are extracted from each sector for
the large collection and stored in a database. The MD5 and SHA hash are also computed
and stored in the database for every sector.
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The database where the image signatures and hashes are stored is comprised of
two tables. The files table contains an MD5 hash of the complete file as a primary key.
The full file path is also stored in the files table. A target field is used to differentiate data
types that will be imported (i.e., noise, interest). Files with a target value of noise consist
of Windows system files, multimedia, documents, and Linux system files. The noise files
provide an assortment of files that would be present on a typical user’s computer. Files
with a target value of interest are JPEG files. JPEG images will have a different target
value than OS files. The primary key for the sigs table is comprised of an MD5 hash of
the file and the sector number for the sector from which the signature was computed. The
sigs table also contains the first 32 bytes, an MD5 hash, and a SHA hash of each sector of
each file in the files table.

Figure 4.1 Database Layout
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Figure 4.1 shows the database layout. The primary key, or PK, for the files table is
shown as file_md5. The file_md5 field is also a foreign key, or FK, for the sigs table. The
primary keys for the sigs table are shown as file_md5 and sector_no. The bold entries in
the table represent that the filed cannot contain a NULL value. The I1, I2, and I3 labels
designate that the fields are indexed fields. When populating the table, duplicate files are
ignored and not stored in the database.

4.3

Prefix Signature Size Comparison
The number of duplicate 32, 16, 8, and 4 byte signatures are extracted from the

database in order to create a histogram that shows the uniqueness for the signature based
on its length. The uniqueness is also compared to that of the MD5 and SHA hashes.
A histogram is a table listing the frequency of occurrence of some variable. A
histogram is used to note the number of occurrences of a specific k byte signature in the
large collection of JPEG image files. This data will assist in determining the uniqueness
of a k byte signature. It shows if a small number of bytes can uniquely identify the sector
or if a larger number of bytes is needed. The histogram data also shows if any specific
byte patterns occur more frequently than others in JPEG files. It shows if the distribution
of uniqueness for a signature is random or if there are any patterns that are common
among the different JPEG image files.
A comparison of the JPEG image signatures is also made to determine if they are
unique versus files that typically appear on a disk. The signatures should not only be
unique compared to other JPEG image files but also unique when compared to files on a
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personal computer such as operating system files, executables, office documents, plain
text documents, and other multimedia files.

CHAPTER V
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS

5.1

Analysis of Results
The following sections show the results of the experiments described in chapter 4.

5.2

Uniqueness Results

5.2.1

Queries
The database described in Section 4.1 was queried to extract all duplicate sector

signatures. This was done multiple times to extract duplicate data for the raw signature,
the MD5 hash, and the SHA hash. Once the duplicates were extracted the number of
duplicates for specific signatures could be extracted. The distribution of the replicated
signatures could also be assessed. There were an exceptionally large number of duplicate
signatures. In order to be able to gather any useful information the data would need to be
condensed but the data would need to retain all of the information that it contained. An
explanation of the query and the results obtained are shown below.
The database contained 53,356,405 signatures and 165,962 different files. The
database was first queried for duplicate raw prefix signatures of size 32, 16, 8, and 4. The
queries were implemented in a C program using the MySql C API. An initial query was
in the program extracted the prefix signatures from the database. The secondary query in
28
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the program extracted the file path of the replicated prefix signatures. The path was used
in order to determine the JPEG and Hybrid replication information.
The process of extracting the signatures and then the file path of the replicated
signatures was executed a second time in order to extract the replicated MD5 hash of the
complete sector. The process of extracting the signatures and file path of the replicated
signatures was executed a third and final time in order to extract the replicated SHA
hashes of the complete sector.
The execution of the program to extract the replicated signatures produced output
that enumerated the degree of replication and the number of occurrences for the degree of
duplication. An example of the output of the program follows in figure 5.1.

199, 1
455, 2
208, 3
464, 3
185, 3
441, 6
1209, 1
130, 6
386, 1
3714, 1
107, 9
619, 1
116, 15
628, 1
93, 13
605, 1
1629, 1
38, 141
294, 5
…
Figure 5.1 Output of the program to extract replicated signatures
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The initial output, as shown in figure 5.1, is an unsorted comma separated value
(CSV) pairing the degree of replication to the number of occurrences of the degree of
replication. The example output in figure 5.1 shows that a degree of replication of 199
occurred only one time for the complete data set (see area highlighted grey in figure 5.1).
The highlighted output shows that there was a single instance where a signature matched
exactly 198 other signatures.

5.2.2

Raw Signature Contents
In order to determine the cause of replication, it was worth studying several

sectors with the highest degree of replication. The ten top 32 byte prefix signatures were
more closely examined. The value of the prefix signature with the highest degree of
replication was all zeros. This 32 byte prefix signature of all zeroes appeared 335,098
times. The second highest degree of replication was 119,058 and the value of the 32 byte
prefix signature was 20202020 repeated to 32 bytes long. This appeared almost
exclusively in JPEG files at random, low sector numbers. The 32 byte prefix signature of
20202020 repeated appeared in sector numbers from approximately 10 to 80. The
following table shows the values of the 32 byte prefix signatures for the top ten degrees
of replication.
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Table 5.1 32 byte prefix signature values for the top ten degrees of replication
Degree

Prefix Signature Value

335,098
119,058
44534
37014
34692
32849
32832
22833
21172
18778
It should be noted that the fourth highest degree of replication (37014) appears
only in JPEG files. It also appears only in the first sector of JPEG files. As explained in
section 2.1, there may be a large number of duplicates because the header information in
different JPEG files is similar. This replication in table 5.1 confirmed the expected
similarities in JPEG file headers. The prefix signature is the header of a JPEG plus a
small portion of data after the header. The header itself takes a significant portion of the
prefix signature, so it generates a large number of duplicate signatures. Another 32 byte
prefix signature of note is the prefix signature with a degree of replication of 18778. The
value contained in this prefix signature only exists in JPEG files in the database. Not only
does it appear only in JPEG files but it also only appears in the second sector of JPEG
files.

5.2.3

Signature Analysis of All File Data Set
The reports generated from the CSV output shows the degree of replication and

number of occurrences for a degree of replication for all sectors in the database, not only
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the JPEG files. The duplication data for all sectors in the database are shown in the
following graphs.
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Figure 5.2 Degree of replication versus the number of occurrences of replication for 32
byte prefix signature data

Figure 5.2 shows the degree of replication on the x-axis and the number of
occurrences for a degree of replication on the y-axis. From this graph, one can observe
that the number of occurrences of the lower degrees of replication is greater than the
number of occurrences for the higher degrees of replication. A 32 byte prefix signature
matches a single other 32 byte prefix signature more often than it matches 335,098 other
sector 32 byte prefix signatures.
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Figure 5.3 Degree of replication versus the percentage of total replications for 32 byte
prefix signature data

Figure 5.3 shows the degree of replication on the x-axis and the percentage of
replications for a degree of replication on the y-axis. It can be observed that the highest
percentages are the lowest and highest degrees of replication. It is shown on the graph
that the 32 byte prefix signatures with a degree of replication of two account for
approximately 22% of the total replication. The highest degree of replication of 335,098
accounts for approximately 10% of the total replication. The majority of the degrees of
replication account for less than 1% of the total replication.
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Figure 5.4 Degree of replication versus the cumulative percentage of total replications
for 32 byte prefix signature data

Figure 5.4 shows the degree of replication on the x-axis and the cumulative
percentage of replications for a degree of replication on the y-axis. It can be observed
from the graph that there is a greater difference between the degrees of replication for the
lowest degrees and the highest degrees of replication.
Figures 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 all show that sectors with a high degree of duplication
and the sectors with a degree of duplication of two accounts for a large percentage of the
total replicated prefix signatures. The following figures show the data retrieved from the
MD5 and SHA queries.

35
1000000

Occurrences of Replication

100000

10000

1000
100

10

1
1

10

100

1000

10000

100000

1000000

Degree of Replication

Figure 5.5 Degree of replication versus the number of occurrences of replication for
MD5 hash data

Figure 5.5 shows the degree of replication on the x-axis and the number of
occurrences for a degree of replication on the y-axis. From this graph, one can observe
that the number of occurrences of the lower degrees of replication is greater than the
number of occurrences for the higher degrees of replication. A MD5 hash matches a
single other MD5 hash more often than it matches 335,098 other complete sector MD5
hashes.

36
25%

Percentage

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%
1

10

100

1000

10000

100000

1000000

Degree of Replication

Figure 5.6 Degree of replication versus the percentage of total replications for MD5 hash
data

Figure 5.6 shows the degree of replication on the x-axis and the percentage of
replications for a degree of replication on the y-axis. It can be observed that the highest
percentages are the lowest and highest degrees of replication. The graph shows that the
MD5 hashes with a degree of replication of two accounts for approximately 22% of the
total replication. The highest degree of replication of 335,098 accounts for approximately
10% of the total replication. The majority of the degrees of replication account for less
than 1% of the total replication.
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Figure 5.7 Degree of replication versus the cumulative percentage of total replications
for MD5 hash data

Figure 5.7 shows the degree of replication on the x-axis and the cumulative
percentage of replications for a degree of replication on the y-axis. It can be observed
from the graph that there is a greater difference between the degrees of replication for the
lowest degrees and the highest degrees of replication.
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Figure 5.8 Degree of replication versus the number of occurrences of replication for
SHA hash data

Figure 5.8 shows the degree of replication on the x-axis and the number of
occurrences for a degree of replication on the y-axis. From this graph, one can observe
that the number of occurrences of the lower degrees of replication is greater than the
number of occurrences for the higher degrees of replication. A SHA hash matches a
single other SHA hash more often than it matches 335,098 other complete sector SHA
hashes.
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Figure 5.9 Degree of replication versus the percentage of total replications for SHA hash
data

Figure 5.9 shows the degree of replication on the x-axis and the percentage of
replications for a degree of replication on the y-axis. It can be observed that the highest
percentages are the lowest and highest degrees of replication. The graph shows that the
SHA hashes with a degree of replication of two account for approximately 22% of the
total replication. The highest degree of replication of 335,098 accounts for approximately
10% of the total replication. The majority of the degrees of replication account for less
than 1% of the total replication.
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Figure 5.10 Degree of replication versus the cumulative percentage of total replications
for SHA hash data

Figure 5.10 shows the degree of replication on the x-axis and the cumulative
percentage of replications for a degree of replication on the y-axis. It can be observed
from the graph that there is a greater difference between the degrees of replication for the
lowest degrees and the highest degrees of replication.
As shown in figures 5.2 through 5.10 there is no deviation between the 32 byte
sector prefix signature duplication data and the duplication data for the MD5 and SHA
hashes. The following figures represent the replication data from the smaller prefix
signature sizes of 16, 8, and 4 bytes.

41
1000000

Occurrences of Replication

100000

10000

1000
100

10

1
1

10

100

1000

10000

100000

1000000

Degree of Replication

Figure 5.11 Degree of replication versus the number of occurrences of replication for 16
byte prefix signature data

Figure 5.11 shows the degree of replication on the x-axis and the number of
occurrences for a degree of replication on the y-axis. From this graph, one can observe
that the number of occurrences of the lower degrees of replication is greater than the
number of occurrences for the higher degrees of replication. A 16 byte prefix signature
matches a single other 16 byte prefix signature more often than it matches 335,098 other
sector 16 byte prefix signatures.
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Figure 5.12 Degree of replication versus the percentage of total replications for 16 byte
prefix signature data

Figure 5.12 shows the degree of replication on the x-axis and the percentage of
replications for a degree of replication on the y-axis. It can be observed that the highest
percentages are the lowest and highest degrees of replication. It is shown on the graph
that the 16 byte prefix signatures with a degree of replication of two account for
approximately 20% of the total replication. The highest degree of replication of 335,098
accounts for approximately 8% of the total replication. The majority of the degrees of
replication account for less than 1% of the total replication.
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Figure 5.13 Degree of replication versus the cumulative percentage of total replications
for 16 byte prefix signature data

Figure 5.13 shows the degree of replication on the x-axis and the cumulative
percentage of replications for a degree of replication on the y-axis. It can be observed
from the graph that there is a greater difference in between the degrees of replication for
the lowest degrees and the highest degrees of replication. Figures 5.14 through 5.19 that
follow show the graphs for the 8 byte and 4 byte prefix signatures.
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Figure 5.14 Degree of replication versus the number of occurrences of replication for 8
byte prefix signature data
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Figure 5.15 Degree of replication versus the percentage of total replications for 8 byte
prefix signature data
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Figure 5.16 Degree of replication versus the cumulative percentage of total replications
for 8 byte prefix signature data
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Figure 5.17 Degree of replication versus the number of occurrences of replication for 4
byte prefix signature data
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Figure 5.18 Degree of replication versus the percentage of total replications for 4 byte
prefix signature data
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Figure 5.19 Degree of replication versus the cumulative percentage of total replications
for 8 byte prefix signature data
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It can be observed in the figures 5.4 through 5.19 that the highest degree of
replication increases each time the signature prefix size is decreased. The first degree of
replication of 2 accounts for a large percentage of the total replications, approximately
20%, for all signature types. It can also be observed that the top several degrees of
replication also account for a large percentage of the total replication. The top six degrees
of replication account for approximately 15% of the total replication. Figure 5.20
compares all signature types.
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Figure 5.20 Comparison of signature types

Figure 5.20 shows a higher overall percentage of the total replication in the
smaller prefix sizes of 16, 8, and 4. An increase in the highest degree of replication when
compared to the MD5, SHA, and 32 byte prefix signatures can also be observed.
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The data above is a representation of not only JPEG files but also other
multimedia and OS system files. Included in the database are web documents, video,
system libraries, system binaries, and other documents such as Microsoft Word. The data
from the queries are to simulate a normal computer hard disk. Windows data from the
Program Files folder, Documents and Settings folder, and Linux files from /var and /usr
are included.
Figure 5.21 shows a comparison of the false positive rate of the various signature
types. It can be observed that MD5, SHA, and the 32 byte prefix signature false positive
rate is equal. This reflects the data presented in figures 5.2 through 5.10. It can be
observed that as the prefix size decreases the false positive rate increases as expected.
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Figure 5.21 False positive rate for all signature types
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Figure 5.22 shows the percent difference in the false positive rate as compared to
MD5, SHA, and the 32 byte prefix signature for the smaller prefix sizes.
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Figure 5.22 Percent difference in false positive rate compared to MD5/SHA/32 byte
prefix

It can be observed from figure 5.22 that the percent difference increases
dramatically for the lower prefix signature sizes. The following section describes the
results from analyzing the set of JPEG files only.

5.2.4

Signature Analysis of JPEG Data Set
The experimental data results that follow were gathered strictly from a large

amount of JPEG images. The data presented in this section represents a scenario in which
a forensic investigator searches for a specific JPEG within a large collection of JPEG
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only files. Such a scenario would occur on a disk where an illicit JPEG was suspect to
exist and the only other data on the disk is other JPEG data.
There were a total of 30,114,537 sectors which represented JPEG information. Of
the 30,114,537 prefix signatures and hashes there were only 824,953 MD5 hashes, SHA
hashes, and 32 byte prefix signatures that appeared twice or more. This gives a false
positive rate of 2.74%. This is significantly lower than the 6.65% replication from the all
files data set. The data is additionally graphed in order to show the degree of duplication
for the prefix signatures and hashes. The following figures represent the degree of
duplication versus the cumulative percentage of all JPEG file sectors examined.
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Figure 5.23 Degree of replication versus the cumulative percentage of total replications
for 32 byte prefix signature of JPEG data set
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Figure 5.24 Degree of replication versus the cumulative percentage of total replications
for MD5 hash of JPEG data set
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Figure 5.25 Degree of replication versus the cumulative percentage of total replications
for SHA hash of JPEG data set
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Again the data shows that there is no difference between the 32 byte prefix
signature and the MD5 and SHA hashes in their ability to uniquely identify a sector. The
data in figures 5.23, 5.24, and 5.25 differs from the data in figures 5.4, 5.7, and 5.10 in
respect to the number of sectors that have a low degree of replication. The sector data
from only JPEG files shows a lower percentage of duplication for signatures or hashes
that have a low degree of replication. In the analysis of the prefix signatures for all file
types, 32 byte prefix signatures with degree of replication of four or less accounts for
approximately 20% of the total replicated signatures. In the JPEG only sectors the total
percentage for degree of replication of four or less only accounts for approximately 10%
of the total replicated signatures.
Figure 5.26 shows a comparison of the different signature types. It can be
observed that again the lower prefix sizes produce a higher false positive rate. The 4 byte
prefix signature again has dramatically different results than the other prefix sizes of 16
bytes and 8 bytes.
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Figure 5.26 Comparison of signature types for JPEG data set

Figure 5.27 shows a comparison of the false positive rate of the various signature
types. It can be observed that MD5, SHA, and the 32 byte prefix signature false positive
rate is equal. It can be observed that as the prefix size decreases the false positive rate
increases as expected.
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Figure 5.27 False positive rate for all signature types for JPEG data set

Figure 5.28 shows the percent difference in the false positive rate as compared to
MD5, SHA, and the 32 byte prefix signature for the smaller prefix sizes.

55

120%
103.64%

Percent Difference

100%

80%

60%
40%

20%

9.73%

5.80%
0%
16 Byte Prefix

8 Byte Prefix

4 Byte Prefix

Prefix Signature Size

Figure 5.28 Percent difference in false positive rate compared to MD5/SHA/32 byte
prefix for JPEG data set

It can be observed from figure 5.28 that the percent difference increases
dramatically for the lower prefix signature sizes. The following section describes the
results from analyzing the hybrid data set.

5.2.5

Signature Analysis of Hybrid Data Set
The data presented in this section represents a scenario in which a forensic

investigator searches for a specific JPEG within a large collection of a random assortment
file types. Such a scenario would occur when searching for an illicit JPEG on a suspect
disk that contained OS files, documents, binary data, multimedia files, and other JPEG
files.
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Again there is no difference between the 32 byte prefix signature and the MD5
and SHA hashes in their ability to uniquely identify a sector. There were a total of
53,356,405 sectors which represented information. Of the 53,356,405 prefix signatures
and hashes there were 1,298,652 MD5 hashes, SHA hashes, and 32 byte prefix signatures
that appeared twice or more. This gives a false positive rate of 2.43%. The data is
additionally graphed in order to show the degree of duplication for the prefix signatures
and hashes. The following figures represent the degree of duplication versus the
cumulative percentage for the hybrid data set.
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Figure 5.29 Comparison of signature types for hybrid data set

Figure 5.29 shows a comparison of the different signature types. It can be
observed that again the lower prefix sizes produce a higher false positive rate. The 4 byte
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prefix signature again has dramatically different results than the other prefix sizes of 16
bytes and 8 bytes.
Figure 5.30 shows a comparison of the false positive rate of the various signature
types. It can be observed that MD5, SHA, and the 32 byte prefix signature false positive
rate is equal. It can be observed that as the prefix size decreases the false positive rate
increases as expected.
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Figure 5.30 False positive rate for all signature types for hybrid data set

Figure 5.31 shows the percent difference in the false positive rate as compared to
MD5, SHA, and the 32 byte prefix signature for the smaller prefix sizes.
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Figure 5.31 Percent difference in false positive rate compared to MD5/SHA/32 byte
prefix for hybrid data set

It can be observed from figure 5.31 that the percent difference increases
dramatically for the lower prefix signature sizes.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION

6.1

Conclusion
The experiments in this thesis were to examine the accuracy of a prefix signature

versus traditional means of uniquely identifying a sector. The experiments also examined
how the length of the prefix signature impacts its accuracy. The experimental results
show that a prefix signature can uniquely identify a sector with as much accuracy as an
MD5 or SHA hash. The total number reoccurring sectors as well as the distribution of
reoccurrence of the prefix signature versus the MD5 or SHA hashes is identical. This
observation holds true not only for a random assortment of files but also for strictly JPEG
files. The prefix signatures can uniquely identify a JPEG sector with more accuracy than
uniquely identifying a random file type sector. There was a 4% or greater difference in
the false positive rate compared to the data set that included OS and document files.
The results show that a 32 byte prefix signature has the highest accuracy in
uniquely identifying a sector versus 16, 8, and 4 byte prefix signatures. The 16 byte
prefix signature’s accuracy is very close to that of the 32 byte prefix signature. The
percentage occupied by the top six degrees of replication is almost identical for both
prefix sizes. The percentage of replicated sectors with the top six degrees of duplication
accounts for approximately 15% of the total replicated prefix signatures. The 32 byte
59
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prefix signature has a lower overall degree of replication than the 16, 8, and 4 byte prefix
signatures. It was shown that the 8 and 4 byte prefix signatures had a much lower
accuracy than the 16 and 32 byte prefix signatures. The top six degree of replication
sector signatures accounted for approximately 15% of the duplicated signatures.
The best choice for a signature would be the MD5 or SHA hash. If performance
was a main concern and space for the database was large then the 32 byte signature
would be the best choice. If space and performance are both very limited then the 16 byte
prefix signature would be the best choice. It is also shown in the experimental results that
the search scenario greatly changes the accuracy of the prefix signatures. It is shown that
if a forensic investigator is searching for an illicit JPEG on a disk containing only JPEG
files that an 8 byte prefix signature would have enough accuracy. Using the prefix
signature can increase the performance of a search because there is significantly lower
overhead in obtaining the first 32 bytes of a sector versus obtaining the sector and then
generating an MD5 or SHA hash of the sector. It should also be noted that the 16 byte
prefix signature could be used in current technologies because it is the same size as an
MD5 hash. A switch to using a 16 byte prefix signature versus an MD5 could be done
with minimal change in the architecture of a system. It is also shown that when
constrained by limited resources and under specific scenarios an 8 byte prefix signature
can uniquely identify a sector with acceptable accuracy.

6.2

Future Work
Section 6.2.1 describes the experiment to compare a software only

implementation versus a hardware implementation of the search technique using
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controlled disk data. This experiment determines the performance and accuracy of the
technique. Section 6.2.4 describes an experiment where the hardware approach is used on
a disk with realistic data (i.e., data derived from actual disks on Windows/Linux
workstations). This experiment determines the usefulness of such an approach on a data
set that would be representative of what would be found in the real world.

6.2.1

Software vs Hardware Experiment
The experiments described the following sections compare the execution speed of

the software versus the hardware implementation.

6.2.2

Software Implementation
Data known to not match signatures is written to the entire disk. Next, signatures

from the master image set are written to random locations. The sector number where the
signature data is written is recorded. The disk is a 250GB disk initialized with the data
known to not mach any signatures. The disk is not formatted and thus it has no file
system. Once the device is initialized the software scanner starts at the first sector in the
drive and proceeds to check the first k bytes of the sector with the signatures in the master
image set. Overlapped I/O in the Windows API is used for disk access in this software
experiment. In overlapped I/O the program may request data from a device and then
proceed with other processing while the data is fetched. It is essentially a non-blocking
read from a physical device. This allows the implementation to efficiently use the
resources to access the disk and search the master image set in a pipelined manner.
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The results obtained from the software search are compared to the time of a
hardware based search implementation done in section 4.3.2. It is expected that the
hardware based approach will yield significantly improved performance over the
software search.

6.2.3

Hardware Implementation
In the hardware based search implementation, the same initialized hard drive is

attached to the FPGA. The same master image set used in the software implementation is
also used. In this experiment the FPGA is used to fetch data from the disk and compare
the first k bytes of the sector read with the signatures stored in the memory on the FPGA
board. The signatures may reside in either on-chip BRAM or in external DDR memory in
order to meet timing constraints of the FPGA disk access.
The majority of the execution time is fetching the signatures from memory to
compare with the current data from the disk drive. Given that there are 512 bytes per
sector. The disk transfer rate is 100MB per second. The database of signatures for the
binary search is 512MB giving the possibility of storing 225 signatures. Data can be read
in at a rate of two bytes every two clocks of the FPGA. The FPGA operates at 100MHz
(i.e., 1 cycle equals 10 nanoseconds).
The worst case time for a binary search is O(log2n). The time required to transfer
512 bytes from disk to the FPGA is 5.12 microseconds (i.e., 5.12 x 10-6 seconds). In order
to analyze the disk at line speed the search must be complete within 5.12 microseconds.
Equation (9) in section 3.6 shows that to find signatures in memory using binary search
requires the sum of the setup time ts, the product of the binary search iterations and the
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time to access the specific memory type ti, and the exit time te. When accessing DDR
memory ti can be described as tu + tDDR. The time tu is constant and the worst case access
of tDDR is approximately 30 cycles of the FPGA clock (i.e., 30 nanoseconds). With ts, tu,
and te equal to one cycle each, it can be shown that the worst case comparison when all
signatures reside in DDR memory is 3 + 25 * 30 cycles or 7.53 microseconds. The speed
of comparison for the worst case scenario is insufficient to meet the 5.12 microsecond
timing constraint derived above. In order to shorten the worst case search time, a portion
of the signatures are moved to the faster on-chip BRAM. The number of signatures that
reside in BRAM versus DDR is determined as shown in figure 4.2 and described below.

Figure 6.1 Midpoints of Binary Search in resident in BRAM

The signature layout in memory is a breadth-first traversal of the tree described in
figure 4.1. The first d levels in depth reside in BRAM. This is shown as the area enclosed
in a dashed line. The movement of a portion of signatures to BRAM decreases the worst
case search time because BRAM access time is significantly smaller than DDR access
time. BRAM can be accessed by the FPGA in a single clock cycle versus the 30 cycles to
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access the DDR. Equation (15) in section 3.6 shows the worst case timing for the search
given that the signatures reside in both BRAM and DDR. Using the above numbers and
equation (15) it is known that 9.14 or 10 accesses must be from BRAM to meet the
timing constraints. The first 10 levels of the binary tree, or 1024 signatures, must reside
in BRAM. The amount of BRAM on a chip is typically limited to a few hundred
kilobytes. With a signature size of 16 bytes, only 16 kilobytes of signatures in BRAM are
required in order to meet the timing constraints. Therefore, it is not impractical to use
BRAM to increase the speed of the binary search to meet the timing constraints of
searching at line speed.
As the number of signatures increases the depth of the tree required to reside in
fast BRAM increases. For example, with a BRAM capacity of 1 MB and a 16 byte
signature size, one could store twenty levels of a binary search, or 65536 signatures in
BRAM and 33,488,896 signatures or 511 MB of signature data in DDR. It can also be
shown that with a 16 byte signature size, and all signatures present in BRAM, one would
be limited to 2509 signatures, or 1.56 x 10144GB of signatures in the master image set to
meet the timing constraints.
This experiment shows that a hardware based implementation yields a much
improved scan time compared to a software only implementation. Initial figures in earlier
research show that a hardware based implementation yield approximately a six fold
performance increase [1].
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6.2.4

FPGA Implementation Viability Experiment
This experiment repeats the hardware implementation experiment in section 4.3.2

with data relevant to a real world scenario with data planted in specific sectors. This
experiment determines the usefulness of analysis based on the first k bytes in a sector
when used on real disk data. The disk contains data typical of a Windows or Linux
workstation. This data includes but is not limited to: plain text files, office documents,
executable files, system configuration files, and other multimedia files. This experiment
tests the viability of such a hardware based analysis technique on a real world
representation of data on a disk.

REFERENCES

[1] Aho, A. and Corasick, M. “Efficient String Matching: an Aid to Bibliographic
Search,” Communications of the ACM, 18:333–40, 1975.
[2] Boyer, R. S. and Moore, J. S. “A fast String Searching Algorithm,”
Communications of the ACM, 20:762–72, 1997.
[3] Court, T. V. and Herbordt, M. C. “Families of FPGA-based Algorithms for
Approximate String Matching,” in Proceedings of the 15th IEEE International
Conference on Application-Specific Systems, Architectures, and Processors
(ASAP’04), 2004.
[4] Dandass, Y.S. “Hardware-Assisted Scanning for Signature Patterns in Image File
Fragments,” System Sciences, 2007. HICSS 2007. 40th Annual Hawaii
International Conference on, Vol., Iss., Jan. 2007. Pages:268-268.
[5] Eastlake, D., and P. Jones, Network Working Group Request for Comments:
3174, US Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA1), http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3174,
September 2001, accessed on March 17, 2007.
[6] The International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee,
Recommendation T.81: “Information Technology – Digital Compression and
Coding of Continuous-Tone Still Images – Requirements and Guidelines,”
Terminal Equipment and Protocols for Telematic Services, International
Telecommunication Union, Sept. 1992.
[7] Jung, H., Baker, Z. K., and Prasanna, V. “Performance of FPGA Implementation
of Bit-split Architecture for Intrusion Detection Systems,” in Proceedings of the
Reconfigurable Architectures Workshop at IPDPS (RAW '06), 2006.
[8] Memon, N.; Pal, A. “Automated reassembly of file fragmented images using
greedy algorithms,” Image Processing, IEEE Transactions on, Vol.15, Iss.2, Feb.
2006. Pages: 385- 393.
[9] Mikus, Nicholas A. "An analysis of disc carving techniques," Master's Thesis,
Naval Postgraduate School. March 2005.

66

[10] Rivest, R., Network Working Group Request for Comments: 1321, The MD5
Message-Digest Algorithm, http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1321, April 1992,
accessed on March 17, 2007.
[11] Snort: The Open Source Network Intrusion Detection System, http://
www.snort.org, 2006.
[12] Tan, L. and Sherwood, T. “Architectures for Bit-Split String Scanning in
Intrusion Detection,” IEEE Micro, January-February 2006.
[13] Xilinx, Inc., Virtex-II Pro and Virtex-II Pro X Platform FPGAs,
http://direct.xilinx.com/bvdocs/publications/ds083.pdf, 2006.

67

